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Abstract
This document considers an economy with many regions and two en-
gines of growth: horizontal R&D, which increases the number of pol-
luting product lines; and vertical R&D, which improves productivity
in these lines. Pollution in any region decreases welfare in all regions.
Any group of regions can form a jurisdiction where a common pol-
icy maker controls pollution. Large jurisdictions, which can better
internalize externality through pollution, perform vertical R&D. Be-
cause jurisdictions face decreasing unit costs of administration, they
expand, performing rst horizontal and then vertical R&D. This gen-
erates an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) on which pollution rst
aggravates and then alleviates.
Journal of Economic Literature: 044, Q55, Q56, Q58
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1 Introduction
In this document, I examine an economy with two engines of growth: hor-
izontal R&D, which creates new polluting product lines, degrading envi-
ronmental quality; and vertical R&D, which improves productivity in these
lines, improving environmental quality. In this setting, I consider the patters
of pollution and economic growth when public policy is endogenous.
According to Kijima et al. (2010), there exists an environmental Kuznets
curve (EKC) as follows: \In early stages of industrialization, pollution grows
rapidly, because high priority is given to increasing material output, and
people are more interested in income than environment. In the later stage,
however, as income rises, the willingness to pay for a clean environment in-
creases by a greater proportion than income, regulatory institutions become
more eective for the environment, and pollution level starts declining." I
specify the regulatory institutions mentioned in this reference as local policy
makers. Some authors introduce taxes/subsidies as instruments of environ-
mental policy.1 In contrast, I assume simply that local policy makers have
the authority to prevent rms from establishing new polluting product lines.
Some papers focus on the allocation of resources between abatement and
other activities.2 In this document, I specify abatement as vertical R&D
which alleviates pollution. Some others use a model of capital accumulation
in their analysis.3 In this document, I take rather a R&D-based model of
endogenous growth as a starting point. Smulders et al. (2012) model the
transition in the pollution pattern as a change in general purpose technol-
ogy and investigate how it interferes with economic growth driven by quality
improvements. In contrast, I assume that horizontal R&D creates new pol-
1Cf. Jones and Manuelli (2001), Egli and Steger (2007), and Smulders et al. (2012).
2Cf. Selden and Song (1995), Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Lieb (2002), Dinda (2005),
Egli and Steger (2007), Brock and Taylor (2010).
3Cf. John and Pechenino (1994), Stokey (1998), Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Jones
and Manuelli (2001), Tahvonen and Salo (2001), Egli and Steger (2007), Lehmijoki and
Palokangas (2010), and Brock and Taylor (2010).
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luting product lines, while vertical R&D creates less-polluting versions of the
old products. I construct a model where the economy keeps on its balanced-
growth path even with changes in environmental policy.
Concerning the relationship between income and environmental degrada-
tion, empirical studies have shown the following:4 One the one hand, some
indicators of environmental degradation (e.g. carbon dioxide emissions and
municipal solid wastes) monotonically increase with respect to income, other
indicators such as the lack of safe water and urban sanitation fall monotoni-
cally as income rises. On the other hand, many indicators (e.g. sulfur dioxide
and nitrous oxide emissions) show an inverted-U relationship with respect to
income. Some indicators (e.g. CO2 and throughput3) exhibit an N shape,
meaning that the environmental degradation starts increasing again after a
decrease to a certain level.5 These empirical studies have been criticized on
two grounds (Kijima et al. 2010) (i) A variety of time series, cross-section
and panel data analyses indicate that the empirical results are sensitive to
the sample of countries chosen and to the time period considered.6 (ii) The
choice of scaling factors in the regression model aects the empirical results.
In this document, I construct a model that explains an inverted-U relation-
ship with respect to stages of development.
In the model of this document, the economy consists of a number of re-
gions. Any subset of regions can establish a jurisdiction where a common
policy maker is authorized to run environmental policy and accept new mem-
bers into the jurisdiction. The policy maker's response then generates the
patters of pollution, economic growth and the extent of the jurisdiction. The
remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
structure of the economy. The microfoundations of regions, jurisdictions and
policy makers are examined in Sections 3, 4 and 5. An equilibrium with an
4Cf. Shak and Bandyopadhyay (1992), and Kijima et al. (2010).
5Cf. de Bruyn and Opschoor (1997), and Sengupta (1997).
6Grossman and Krueger (1993), Selden and Song (1994), and Hill and Magnani (2002).
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EKC (or an inverted-U relationship) is considered in Section 6.
2 The economy as a whole
The economy consists of a number of regions which are placed evenly within
the limit [0; 1]. All regions produce the same nal good, the price of which
is normalized at unity. There are three primary inputs: pollutants, skilled
labor and unskilled labor. Each region supplies inelastically one unit of both
skilled and unskilled labor. The use of pollutants anywhere decreases welfare
everywhere. There are no extraction costs of pollutants.7
I assume that research and development (R&D) employs only skilled la-
bor, and skilled labor is used only in R&D, for simplicity.8 The nal good is
produced from unskilled labor and a number of intermediate goods. I assume
that each intermediate good is produced only from pollutants, for simplicity.9
There are two types of R&D: horizontal R&D, which increases the number
of product lines that produce intermediate goods, generating dirty growth
(i.e. growth with pollution); and vertical R&D, which improves the level of
productivity in the already existing product lines, generating clean growth
(i.e. growth without pollution). The supplier of pollutants discriminates be-
tween product lines. Finally, I assume that a product line faces increasing
returns to scale since otherwise, there would be no dynamics of pollution: it
would be all the same whether the number of polluting product lines or the
quantity of pollutants in each product line is increased.
7Extraction costs would make product lines interdependent, in which case analytical
solution of the dynamic optimization in section 5 were extremely complicated.
8The input of skilled labor to manufacturing would excessively complicate the model,
without having any qualitative impact on the results.
9Inputting unskilled labor or the nal good into the production of intermediate goods
would excessively complicate the analysis, with no qualitative impact on the results.
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2.1 Regulatory institutions
Any subset of regions,  k  [0; 1], can form a jurisdiction k. Consequently,
all regions i 2 [0; 1] are organized into m jurisdictions as follows:
m[
k=1
 k = [0; 1];  k
\
 ` = ; for k 6= `, nk :=
Z
i2 k
di 2 [0; 1]; (1)
where nk is the proportion of regions organized in jurisdiction k 2 [0;m].
Each jurisdiction k has a benevolent policy maker (hereafter labeled k) that
controls the establishment of new polluting product lines and decides on new
members to the jurisdiction. Policy makers can respond to environmental
degradation by extending the scope of the jurisdiction. Because this response
is slow due to the adjustment costs of the scope, the economy will switch
(possibly several times) between clean and dirty growth.
2.2 Welfare
Pollution P depends on the total quantity of pollutants,
R m
0
Xkdk, and time
t as follows:
P
:
=
Z m
0
Xkdk

e t with 0 <  < 1; (2)
where  is the constant rate of abatement: if there is no use of pollutants,R m
0
Xkdk = 0, then the nature absorbs pollution at the rate .
Temporary utility in jurisdiction k increases with consumption per region
in that jurisdiction, Ck, and decreases with economy-wide pollution P :
uk
:
= CkP
 ;  >  > 0;
where  and  are parameters. The expected inter-temporal utility in juris-
diction k starting at time T is then given by
E
Z 1
T
uke
 (t T )dt = E
Z 1
T
CkP
 e (t T )dt; (3)
where t is time,  > 0 the constant rate of time preference and E the expec-
tation operator.
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3 Regions
There are four sectors in each region i 2 [0; 1]: the manufacturing sector,
in which competitive rms make the nal good from unskilled labor and
the existing intermediate goods; the intermediate-goods sector, in which mo-
nopolistic rms make intermediate goods for the nal-good rms only from
pollutants; the horizontal R&D sector, in which competitive R&D rms pro-
duce blueprints for new intermediate goods only from skilled labor; and the
vertical R&D sector, in which competitive R&D rms produce blueprints
for better versions of old intermediate goods only from skilled labor. Be-
cause each blueprint authorizes to produce a dierent intermediate good, the
number of intermediate goods is equal to that of blueprints in each region.
The administration of any jurisdiction k 2 [0;m] is subject to increasing
returns to scale:10 it employs f(nk) units of unskilled labor per region, where
nk is the size of the jurisdiction and df=dnk < 0. Furthermore, the integration
of new members in any jurisdiction k 2 [0;m] involves adjustment costs in
terms of unskilled labor. Thus, there is a convex and linearly homogenous
adjustment cost function with respect to the number of old members, nk,
and the number of new members, _nk
:
= dnk
dt
, as follows (cf. Fig. 1):
(gk)nk; gk
:
=
_nk
nk
; (0) = 0; 00 > 0; (4)
where gk is the growth rate of jurisdiction k 2 [0;m] and (gk) adjustment
costs per region in that jurisdiction.
Because region i 2  k possesses one unit of both skilled and unskilled labor,
its labor markets are balanced, if
li + f(nk) + (gk) = 1 and hi + zi = 1 with f
0(nk) < 0 for k 2  k, (5)
where li (f) is unskilled labor devoted to manufacturing (administration), 
unskilled labor devoted to integrating new members and hi (zi) skilled labor
devoted to horizontal (vertical) R&D in region i.
10With this assumption, jurisdictions have incentives to expand.
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Figure 1: The adjustment cost function (gk).
3.1 The manufacturing sector
A number bi of product lines provides specic intermediate inputs for man-
ufacturing in region i 2 [0; 1]. The representative competitive rm produces
the quantity Yi of the nal good from unskilled labor li and intermediate
inputs, xij for j 2 [0; bi], according to [cf. (5)]
Yi = l

i
Z bi
0
aij(xij   )1 dj =

1  f(nk)  (gk)
 Z bi
0
aij(xij   )1 dj;
(6)
where aij is the level of productivity in product line j 2 [0; bi] in region
i 2 [0; 1],  2 (0; 1) is a parameter and  > 0 a xed cost in a product line.
3.2 The intermediate-goods sector
In equilibrium, the price pij for intermediate input xij is equal to the marginal
product of that input, @Yi=@xij. Noting (6), this implies
pij =
@Yi
@xij
= (1  )li (xij   ) aij: (7)
Because the supply of pollutants involves no costs, the supplier of pollutants
in product line j maximizes its prot [cf. (7)]
ij = pijxij = (1  )li (xij   ) xijaij
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by its supply xij to product line j, given total labor devoted to production
in region i, li, and productivity in that product line, aij. The rst-order
condition of this maximization, @ij=@xij = 0, implies
xij = x
:
= =(1  ) = constant for all i and j: (8)
3.3 The vertical R&D sector
In product line j 2 [0; bi] in region i, competitive rms employ zij units of
skilled labor to produce blueprints for better versions of intermediate input
j 2 [0; bi]. Then, the total quantity of skilled labor devoted to vertical R&D
in all product lines j 2 [0; bi] in region i is
zi
:
=
Z bi
0
zijdj: (9)
The invention of a new technology raises the a serial number of technology,
ij, by one and the level of productivity, aij, by constant  > 1 in product
line j. Thus, the level of productivity in product line j is
aij
:
= ij = e(log)ij with  > 1: (10)
The improvement of technology in product line j (i.e. the increase ij by
one) is in xed proportion  to labor zij devoted to R&D in product line j.
I assume that in a small period of time dt,
 the probability that R&D leads to development of a new technology is
given by zijdt, where  > 0 is a constant,
 the probability that R&D remains without success is given by 1 zijdt.
This denes a Poisson process qij with
dqij =

1 with probability zij dt,
0 with probability 1  zij dt, (11)
where dqij is the increment of the process qij.
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3.4 The horizontal R&D sector
The average input to horizontal R&D in jurisdiction k, Hk, and that in the
other jurisdictions ` 6= k, H k, are dened by
Hk
:
=
1
nk
Z
i2 k
hidi; H k
:
=
1
1  nk
Z
i=2 k
hidi; (12)
where nk =
R
i2 k di and 1  nk =
R
i=2 k di [cf. (1)]. Technological knowledge
in horizontal R&D in region i 2 [0; 1] is measured by the stock of blueprints
in that region, bi. Correspondingly, technological knowledge in the whole
economy is given by Z 1
0
bidi = nkBk + (1  nk)B k; (13)
where Bk is the average technological knowledge in jurisdiction k, and B k
that elsewhere in the economy:
Bk
:
=
1
nk
Z
i2 k
bidi; B k
:
=
1
1  nk
Z
i=2 k
bidi =
1
1  nk
Z
` 6=k
n`B`d`: (14)
Because rms performing horizontal R&D adopt technology from the `old'
product lines in the economy, then, in each region i, new blueprints for new
product lines, _bi
:
= dbi
dt
, are produced from labor devoted to horizontal R&D in
that region, hi, so that productivity is in xed proportion  to technological
knowledge in the whole economy, (13):
_bi = [nkBk + (1  nk)B k]hi for i 2 [0; 1]. (15)
The parameter  characterizes technology spillover : the higher , the easier
it is to adopt technology from the `old' product lines. Noting (12), (14)
and (15), the average production of new blueprints for horizontal R&D in
jurisdiction k is given by
_Bk =
1
nk
Z
i2 k
_bidi = [nkBk + (1  nk)B k]Hk: (16)
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4 Jurisdictions
4.1 Pollution
The use of pollutants in jurisdiction k 2 [0;m], Xk, is equal to that through-
out the regions i 2  k of that jurisdiction. Noting (8) and (14), this implies
Xk
:
=
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
xijdj

di = x
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
dj

di = x
Z
i2 k
bidi = xnkBk:
(17)
Correspondingly, pollution in other jurisdictions X k, is equal to the sum of
pollutants throughout regions i =2  k. Noting (14) and (17), this implies
X k
:
=
Z
` 6=k
X`d` = x
Z
` 6=k
n`B`d` = x(1  nk)B k: (18)
Noting (2), (17) and (18), total pollution P evolves according to:
P
:
=
Z m
0
Xkdk

e t = x

nkBk + (1  nk)B k

e t: (19)
4.2 Welfare
Because the inventor of a new product line bi adopts technological knowledge
from the old product lines j 2 [0; bi), the initial productivity in product line
bi, aibi , is determined by the average productivity of the latter, ai:
aibi = ai
:
=
1
bi
Z bi
0
aijdj: (20)
Noting (14) and (20), the average productivity in jurisdiction k, Ak, is
Ak
:
=
1
nkBk
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
aijdj

di =
1
nkBk
Z
i2 k
aibidi; (21)
where nkBk
:
=
R
i2 k bidi is the number of product lines and
R
i2 k
 R bi
0
aijdj

di
is the sum of productivity parameters aij in jurisdiction k. Because there is
only one nal good in the economy, noting (6), (8) and (21), consumption
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per region in jurisdiction k, Ck, is equal to the average output of the regions
i 2  k of the jurisdiction as follows:
Ck
:
=
1
nk
Z
i2 k
Yidi =
(x  )1 
nk

1  f(nk)  (gk)
 Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
aijdj

di
= (x  )1 1  f(nk)  (gk)AkBk; (22)
where nk is the number of regions and
R
i2 k Yidi the total output of the
consumption good in jurisdiction k. Noting (19) and (22), the expected
utility in jurisdiction k, (3), becomes
E
Z 1
T
CkP
 e (t T )dt
=
(x  )(1 )
x
Z 1
T
[1  f(nk)  (gk)]AkBke (t T )
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] dt; (23)
where 
:
=     is a constant. It is assumed  > 0, since otherwise the
integral (23) would not converge.
4.3 Clean technological change
Given (20), the average productivity, ai, is independent of the number of
product lines, bi, in each region i 2 [0; 1]:
@ai
@bi
=
aibi
bi
  1
b2i
Z bi
0
aijdj =
aibi
bi
  ai
bi
= 0: (24)
This implies that the average productivity, Ak, is independent of the average
number of product lines, Bk, in each jurisdiction k:
@Ak=@Bk = 0: (25)
The index of clean technology for jurisdiction k, k, is given by
k
:
=
logAk
log 
or Ak = e
(log)k = k : (26)
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Given (10), (21), (25) and (26), the index k depends only on the indices ij
of clean technology for j 2 [0; bk), with the properties:
@k
@ij
=
1
log 
1
Ak
@Ak
@ij
=
1
log 
1
Ak
1
nkBk
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
@aij
@ij
dj

di
=
1
nkAkBk
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
aijdj

di = 1 for j 2 [0; bi):
By this, (1), (5), (9), (11), (12) and the Mean Value Theorem, one obtains
P(k increases by one) = 1
nk
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
@k
@ij
P(ij increased by one)dj

di
=
1
nk
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
@k
@ij
zijdj

di =

nk
Z
i2 k
Z bi
0
zijdj

di =

nk
Z
i2 k
zidi
=

nk
Z
i2 k
[1  hi]di = (1 Hk);
where P() is the probability function. Noting this and (11), one can dene
a Poisson process qk for whole jurisdiction k as follows:
dqk =

1 with probability (1 Hk)dt,
0 with probability 1  (1 Hk)dt, (27)
where dqk is the increment of the process qk.
5 Policy makers
Policy maker k can take new regions as new members into jurisdiction k 2
[0;m] and prevent R&D rms from establishing new polluting product lines
in regions i 2  k belonging to jurisdiction k 2 [0;m]. Thus, it controls the
growth rate gk
:
= _nk=nk of that jurisdiction and labor devoted to horizontal
R&D in jurisdiction k, Hk.
5.1 The maximization of welfare
Policy maker k maximizes the expected utility of jurisdiction k, (23), by
Hk 2 [0; 1] and gk := _nk=nk subject to nk  1 [cf. (1)], the development
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of pollution, (19), and technological change in vertical and horizontal R&D,
(27) and (16), given technological knowledge elsewhere, B k.
Assume for a while that nk < 1. Omitting the constant (x  )(1 )x ,
the value of the optimal program of policy maker i 2 [0; n] starting at time
T becomes
 (k; nk; Bk; T )
:
= max
Hk2[0;1]; gk
Z 1
T
[1  f(nk)  (gk)]AkBke (t T )
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] dt: (28)
Let us denote
 k =  (k; nk; Bk; T ); e k =  (k + 1; nk; Bk; T ): (29)
The Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (28) is then
  = max
Hk2[0;1]; gk
	(Hk; gk; nk; k; Bk; T ); (30)
where, by (4) and (28),
	(Hk; gk; nk; k; Bk; T )
:
=
[1  f(nk)  (gk)]AkBk
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] + (1 Hk)
 f k    k+ @ k
@Bk
_Bk +
@ k
@nk
_nk
=
[1  f(nk)  (gk)]AkBk
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] + (1 Hk)
 e k    k
+
@ k
@Bk
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k]Hk + @ k
@nk
gknk: (31)
The Lagrangean for the maximization in (30) is
Lk = 	(Hk; gk; nk; k; Bk; B k; T ) + kHk + k(1 Hk); (32)
where the multipliers k and k satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
kHk = 0; k; k(1 Hk) = 0; k  0: (33)
Noting (31), one obtains the rst-order conditions for the maximization (30):
@Lk
@Hk
= k   k +
@ k
@Bk


nkBk + (1  nk)B k
   f k    k = 0; (34)
@Lk
@gk
=
@ k
@nk
nk   0(gk) [1  f(nk)  (gk)]
 1AkB

k
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] = 0: (35)
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5.2 Convergence
To solve the dynamic program, one can try the solution that the value of the
program,  k, is in xed proportion #k > 0 to temporary utility:
 k =  (k; nk; Bk; T ) = #k
[1  f(nk)  (gk)]AkBk
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] : (36)
From (26), (29) and (36) it then follows that
e k
 k
=

Akjk+1
Akjk

=  > 1;
@ k
@Bk
Bk
 k
=   nkBk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k ;
@ k
@nk
nk
 k
=   f
0(nk)nk
1  f(nk)  (gk)  
(Bk  B k)nk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k : (37)
Inserting (36) and (37) into the Bellman equation (30) and (31) yields
 = 	= k
=
1
#k
+ (1 Hk)
e k
 k
  1

+
@ k
@nk
nk
 k
gk +
@ k
@Bk

 k
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k]Hk
=
1
#k
+ (   1)(1 Hk) 

f 0(nk)nk
1  f(nk)  (gk) +
(Bk  B k)nk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k

gk
+

  nkBk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k



nk + (1  nk)B k
Bk

Hk:
Solving for 1=#k yields
0 < 1=#k
= + (1  )(1 Hk) +

f 0(nk)nk
1  f(nk)  (gk) +
(Bk  B k)nk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k

gk
 

  nkBk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k



nk + (1  nk)B k
Bk

Hk:
Inserting (36) and (37) into the condition (35) yields
0 =
1
 k
@Lk
@gk
=
@ k
@nk
nk
 k
  0(gk) [1  f(nk)  (gk)]
 1AkB

k
[nkBk + (1  nk)B k] k
=   f
0(nk)nk
1  f(nk)  (gk)  
(Bk  B k)nk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k  
0(gk)
[1  f(nk)  (gk)]#k :
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Noting (4) and (5), this implies
0(gk)

Bk=B k
=   #k|{z}
+
f 0(nk)| {z }
 
nk|{z}
+
> 0; gk > 0; _nk > 0;
for nk < 1. This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 With enough symmetry among the regions, Bk  B k, ju-
risdiction k has incentives to expand (i.e. _nk > 0) as long as there is space
to expand (i.e. nk < 1).
Given (4) and Proposition 1, the constraint nk  1 (which has so far
been ignored) takes the form gk

nk=1
= 0: In other words, once jurisdiction k
contains the whole economy (i.e. nk ! 1), its expansion stops (i.e. gk falls
discontinuously to zero).
Inserting (36) and (37) into the condition (34) yields
1
 k
@	
@Hk
=
k   k
 k
+
@ k
@Bk
1
 k


nkBk + (1  nk)B k
  e k
 k
  1

=
k   k
 k
+

  nkBk
nkBk + (1  nk)B k



nk + (1  nk)B k
Bk

  (   1) = 0: (38)
From (33) and (38) it follows that
Hk = 0 , 
 
Bk=B k; nk
 :
=
(   1) 

  nkBk=B k
nkBk=B k + 1  nk



nk + (1  nk)B k
Bk

> 0;
Hk = 1 , 
 
Bk=B k; nk

< 0: (39)
Because, given (39), it holds true that
nkBk=B k
nkBk=B k + 1  nk| {z }
+
<  < ;
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@
@(Bk=B k)
= 

nk + (1  nk)B k
Bk| {z }
+

(1  nk)n2k
nkBk=B k + 1  nk| {z }
+
+

  nkBk=B k
nkBk=B k + 1  nk| {z }
+

(1  nk)| {z }
+

B k
Bk
2
> 0;
Hk = 0 is likely for high values and Hk = 1 for low values of Bk=B k. This
result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 There is convergence in the management of pollution: juris-
dictions k with a relatively large (relatively small) dirty capital per region,
Bk=B k, are more likely subject to clean (dirty) growth Hk = 0 (Hk = 1).
6 The symmetric case Bk = B k
Assume now that all jurisdictions are equally polluted on the average, Bk =
B k. Then, conditions (39) become
Hk = 0 , (   1)+ (nk   ) > 0 , nk > nk :=
1


+ (1  )


;
Hk = 1 , nk < nk: (40)
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 A small jurisdiction (with nk < nk) performs dirty growth,
Hk = 1, and a big jurisdiction (with nk > nk) clean growth, Hk = 0.
Because jurisdiction k adjusts its allocation of skilled labor, Hk, immedi-
ately, but its size nk only with time (cf. Proposition 1), Proposition 3 leads
to the following corollary:
Proposition 4 Jurisdiction k performs a cycle with dirty growth at early
stages nk < nk and clean growth at later stages nk > nk of development.
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If the parameter of technology spillover is greater than the constant rate
of abatement,  > , then, noting (2) and (16), pollution (19) evolves in the
vicinity of the symmetric equilibrium Bk = B k according to
_P
P

Bk=B k
=
d logP
dt

Bk=B k
=
d logBk
dt

Bk=B k
  =
_Bk
Bk

Bk=B k
 
= Hk    =

    > 0 for nk < nk,
  < 0 for nk > nk. (41)
This yields an environmental Kuznets curve (Fig. 2) on which pollution P
rst increases and then decreases.
time
Pollution 
0
Figure 2: An environmental Kuznets curve.
7 Conclusions
Following the approach represented e.g. by Jones and Manuelli (2001), Egli
and Steger (2007), and Smulders et al. (2012), this document attempts
to explain the patterns of environmental degradation by the behavior of
regulatory institutions. It considers an economy with a large number of
regions, so that any subset of regions can establish a jurisdiction that runs
environmental policy independently: it has a representative policy maker
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that has authority to regulate the establishment of new polluting units and
to accept new regions in the jurisdiction.
In the model, nal goods are manufactured from (unskilled) labor and a
number of intermediate goods. Each intermediate good is produced in a sep-
arate product line from pollutants according to increasing returns to scale.
Consequently, even when there are no extraction costs for pollutants, there is
an equilibrium for a monopoly that provides pollutants for the intermediate-
good sector. In this setting, economic growth can appear in two forms:
horizontal R&D that increases the number of polluting product lines, gener-
ating dirty growth; and vertical R&D that improves the level of productivity
in the already existing product lines, generating clean growth. In addition to
these activities, there is natural abatement that absorbs pollution with time.
Because dirty and clean growth rates are multiplicative, jurisdictions keep
on their balanced-growth paths, but so that clean and dirty growth can per-
mutate. If the management of a jurisdiction is subject to increasing returns
to scale, but if its expansion involves adjustment costs, then the policy mak-
ers attempt to expand their jurisdiction slowly, generating rst dirty and
then clean growth. This generates an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC),
on which pollution rst aggravates and then alleviates.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
game-theoretical model is used to derive results on growth and environment,
the following conclusion seems to be justied. The spillover of polluting
technology associated with policy makers' sluggish response to environmental
problems may be the cause for an EKC.
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